"Food-delivery competition will ultimately shift from 'price-stock games' to 'value-increment creation.'"
"Food-delivery competition will ultimately shift from 'price-stock games' to 'value-increment creation.'"
One morning, wanting to buy coffee, I browsed three apps — Meituan, Ele.me, and JD — and their pages looked copy-pasted: Meituan's "spend 30, get 15 off," Ele.me's "20 off your first order," and JD's newcomer coupons could cut a latte to half price. It was like three supermarkets selling the same milk, able only to lure customers with "buy one, get one free." After JD entered the market, why can't the food-delivery war escape the "subsidies-for-traffic" cycle? And where does the breakthrough lie?
01 The First Principle of the Food-Delivery Industry: Fulfillment Efficiency
The essence of the food-delivery industry is to "help users get the products they want delivered to a designated location at an acceptable price and within an acceptable time." There is only one core: fulfillment efficiency.
First, let's break down the core logic of a food-delivery platform: it is essentially the "intermediary hub connecting merchants, riders, and users," and its value chain has just three links: "findable (merchant coverage), fast delivery (rider efficiency), and willing to buy (user discounts)."
But "fulfillment efficiency" is not just about "how fast delivery is"; it is the smoothness of the entire chain "from the user's order to receiving the product": for example, how quickly the merchant accepts the order, whether the rider's pickup route is smooth, and whether time is lost to spills from packaging. In the early days of food delivery, Meituan used its "Super Brain dispatch system" to cut average delivery time from 40 minutes to 30, while Ele.me used "Hummingbird crowdsourcing" to cover more neighborhoods — both were essentially racing to seize the first-mover advantage in "fulfillment efficiency."
Today, JD, Meituan, and Alibaba share essentially the same underlying logic: all want to make the connection among "the supply side (merchants), the fulfillment side (riders), and the demand side (users)" smoother. So why, in the end, does no one compete on "fulfillment" but instead dive into "price"?
02 The First Principle of the Food-Delivery War: Homogeneous Competition
The food-delivery war among Meituan, Alibaba, and JD is, at its core, "the homogeneous competition of platform enterprises."
On the surface, the three companies' competition looks lively: JD uses its supermarket supply chain to fill the gap in "instant retail," Meituan guards its core business of "food delivery + in-store," and Alibaba's Ele.me pulls in supermarkets and pharmacies to broaden scenarios. But the core contradiction of this war is not at all "whose service is better"; it is the homogeneous competition of platform enterprises: the "weapons" in everyone's hands are too alike, and there is simply no differentiated breakthrough to be found.
Returning to user needs, when I order food delivery I evaluate three dimensions: "quality, time, and price."
On quality: the supply side, i.e., the merchant side:
Food-delivery "quality" is the merchant's supply capability — the taste of the dishes, packaging hygiene, and ingredient freshness are all decided by the merchant. The platform can at most add an "eat with confidence" label and cannot directly intervene. It is like the same Sichuan restaurant selling its shredded pork with garlic sauce on both Meituan and JD Daojia: the taste and portion are no different; in fact, many merchants open on multiple platforms, so the platforms simply cannot differentiate on "quality."
Moreover, if you can onboard KFC, I can sign McDonald's; if you lock in a local chain supermarket, I'll turn around and recruit the convenience store next door. No one can monopolize exclusive supply.
On time: the fulfillment side, i.e., the rider side:
Industry data shows that within 3 km of the city center, 25–35 minutes is the "safe delivery window" for food delivery — one minute faster and the rider's risk doubles; during peaks or rain, delivery times lengthen further. The three companies' dispatch systems are at comparable levels, and users perceive at most a 2–3 minute difference in delivery speed; no one would give up another platform's 10-yuan subsidy for such a small gap.
Every platform runs a "dedicated delivery + crowdsourcing" model; to differentiate, the only option is to spend heavily adding riders — but no one can sustain rising costs over the long term.
On price: the demand side, i.e., the user side:
When the first two dimensions cannot be differentiated, "price wars" become the only choice. When people open the app, the first thing they look at is not "what's special about this platform" but "which one has red packets today" — you offer discounts on minimum spend, I offer markdowns; you launch member coupons, I launch viral red packets. It's the same trick with a fresh label.
But this leverage is short-lived: it attracts only "price-sensitive users" — those who use Meituan when its subsidies are high today, switch to JD when it sends coupons tomorrow, and instantly change platforms the moment subsidies stop. Such "subsidy-loyalty users" are not a platform's real users at all.
When a platform cannot create unique value in "connection efficiency" or "service experience," it can only fall into the trap of "homogeneous competition" and keep waging price wars. This is the first principle of the food-delivery war: "the homogeneous competition of platform enterprises." Everyone is trapped in the "same playbook" and can only grab market share by "out-spending each other."
03 Returning to the First Principle of the Business Model: Value Creation
When the food-delivery war keeps grinding on price, it can only end up as a "lose-lose-lose" market, because low prices will inevitably hurt quality, and in the end it is we consumers who get hurt! Food-delivery competition will ultimately shift from "price-stock games" to "value-increment creation" — not "using cheapness to pull in users," but "using real demand to retain users."
